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Abstract
This paper develops a model where two agents in different sectors face uncorrelated income risks and mutually
self-insure. We discuss how the rent arising from risk pooling modiﬁes the wage distribution in the sector where the
employer behaves as a monopsonist.
Keywords: risk pooling, family transfers.
JEL classiﬁcation: O130, O150, O170.
￿We have beneﬁted from discussions with Sylvain Dessy, Bernard Fortin and Simon Van Norden. We are responsible for any remaining errors
and omissions.
yCorresponding author: Département d’Économique, Université Laval, Cité Universitaire, Québec, Canada, G1K-7P4, e-mail: pascal.st-
amour@ecn.ulaval.ca, tel.: (418) 656-5610, fax: (418) 656-7798.1 Introduction
Inter-sectorial transfers by members of extended families are an important component of household incomes in most
developing countries (World Bank, 1994). These transfers arise in part because of incomplete insurance markets;
agents who cannot hedge against crop failure, health problems or unemploymentrisks use non-marketmechanisms as
a substitute (Ligon et al., 1997). Typically extended families have a comparative advantage in providing such services
because of superior information that mitigate moral hazard and adverse selection problems (Pollak, 1985). Moreover,
most of the labour force in those economies is employed in agriculture (Larson and Mundlak, 1997, Table 2). Land,
an essential input in that sector, is controlled by a small number of landlords (Tomich et al., 1995) who often use a
collusive strategy when hiring workers (Bardhan, 1989).
This note focuses on the link between inter-sectorial transfers between agents with symmetric information, and
wage distributions in labour markets characterized by intra-sectorial collusion among employers. We ﬁrst illustrate
how such transfers modify the distribution of wages paid by an employer who behaves as a monopsonist. Secondly,
we indicate why transferscan imply a transmission mechanism for wage distributionsacross sectors. Finally, we show
why, in the absence of inter-sectorial collusion, the economy may be stuck in a poverty trap.
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2, each with many identical agents (workers) and a small
number of employers. Agents do not have access to a storage technology, while they derive utility from consump-




































We abstract from migration across sectors. The realization of the agents’ income is common knowledge to agents, but
notto employers. Thisstructureprecludesanyformof intra-sectorialrisk pooling,includingself-insuranceandmarket
insurance. Consequently,two risk-averse agents may agree to pool risk across sectors and transfer part of their income




0 denote the transfer from a representative agent in sector
i (henceforth
agent
i) to an agent in the other sector. This transfer is determined after some bilateral bargaining process – which is
taken as given in this analysis – and takes place when only one of the two agents receives the low income. In this case,
the high-income earner transfers part of his revenues to the low-income one.1





































































































































































2 is the lowest probabilitythat agent 2 receives
w
2 such that agent 1 acceptsthe risk-poolingagreement. Using




































































It can be shown that a necessary condition for transfers to take place between agents is that the marginal beneﬁt













































w and both agents have the same bargaining power.




















). Other elements that determine the transfers
t
i might include non-insurance motives such as altruism, over which preferences












j. Under condition(4), the inequalities (2) and (3)deﬁne a convexcontractset in the probability







)lie in the shaded region.2
Demand for labour in sector 1 is characterized by imperfect competition with collusion among employers. As in
Bencivengaand Smith (1997),a representativeprincipaluses a mixed strategy and announcesan employmentcontract
which consists of the probability
p




2 and all wages as given.3 For now, sector 2
is treated as exogenous in this analysis. The principal chooses
p
1 to maximize agent 1’s risk-pooling surplus
r
1.H e
does so because, behaving as a monopsonist, he will eventually be able to extract this rent from agent 1 through some




) in equation (1) implies that
r






















































Consequently, the principal chooses the lowest
p
1 which satisﬁes the participation constraint for agent 2 given by






1 (see the left panel of Figure 1).
Following an exogenousincrease in
p
2, the relative risk of agent 2 of receiving
w
2 decreases compared to the risk
faced by agent 1 of obtaining the low wage. Hence, a risk-pooling contract becomes less attractive to agent 2. The
principal who wishes to maintain the risk-sharing arrangement between the two agents must also raise the probability
of the high outcome for agent 1. Therefore, risk-sharing between agents in different sectors allows for an alternative
inter-sectorial transmission mechanism for wage distributions.
Moreover, under perfect intra-sectorial collusion but in the absence of inter-sectorial collusion, extracting the rent
created by risk pooling may lead to a poverty trap. In the right panel of Figure 1, if the principal in sector 2 is also a









1 as given. Subsequently, the principal in sector 1 responds by choosing a lower
p




















2, risk aversion guarantees that condition (4) is veriﬁed.






) is the probability of a bad crop, the principal in sector
i can affect the risk of




i are ﬁxed institutional wages for employment in








) are the corresponding employment rates chosen by the principal.
33 Conclusion
This paper has developed a two-sector model to show how inter-agents transfers can affect the distribution of wages.
When the realization of states is observed only by risk-averse agents with uncorrelated income risk, mutual risk-
poolingagreementscanarise. Therentthuscreatedcanbeextractedbyamonopsonistemployerwhochoosesthewage
distribution to maximize the surplus of his employees which he subsequently extracts. One important implication is
a transfers-based inter-sectorial transmission mechanism. This linkage between wage distributions across sectors can
have perverse effects if both sectors are monopsonistic and do not collude: all employment tends to be concentrated
in low-wages allocations.
Finally, an application of our analysis could be rural and urban sectors where it is in the best interest of a unique
rural employer to keep up with the pace of development in the urban sector by increasing rural employment in high
wage activities.
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Convex contract set: shaded area is joint distribution
where risk-pooling contracts take place.
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